Insights

Analysis, briefings and working notes

We publish when there is something worth saying — on a rhythm rather than in bursts. The first publication is out: a briefing on the EU AI Act timeline and the two deadlines most organisations conflate. Further notes and briefings are planned on a stated cadence, and this page lists both what has been published and what is planned.

Publications

Current publications

Written by AZMA and updated as work develops.

analysis

The EU AI Act Timeline: Two Deadlines Most Organisations Conflate

The AI Act's 2026 and 2027 dates are not the same obligation. The verified timeline, row by row, and why the distinction changes what you have to do and when.

The distinction that matters

Most organisations asking about the EU AI Act are really asking two different questions and treating them as one. They ask “when does the AI Act apply to us?” and expect a single answer. There are at least four, and they attach to different obligations, different actors and different system categories.

The two that get conflated most often are the transparency duties that bite in 2026 and the stand-alone high-risk obligations that bite in 2027. They are not the same rule arriving on two possible dates. They are two different bodies of obligation, and a firm that treats the 2026 date as “the AI Act deadline” will be unprepared for the one that actually applies to it.

The verified timeline

Four rows matter for planning. Everything else is either transitional and narrow, or not yet settled.

DateWhat applies
2 August 2026General application of the Act’s in-force provisions. The Article 50 transparency duties become enforceable, as do the enforcement powers of the AI Office and national authorities. Other Article 50 duties have no extension.
2 December 2026Transitional deadline for providers of generative AI systems to meet the Article 50(2) machine-readable marking duty — and it is narrower than it sounds. It applies to generative systems already placed on the market before 2 August 2026. A system placed on the market on or after 2 August 2026 must comply from the moment it is placed on the market: there is no grace period for it. The same date brings new Article 5 prohibitions on non-consensual intimate imagery and on CSAM generation.
2 December 2027The stand-alone Annex III high-risk obligations apply — biometrics, critical infrastructure, education, employment, essential services, law enforcement, migration and the administration of justice.
2 August 2028High-risk systems embedded in regulated products (Annex I — medical devices, machinery and similar) come into scope.

Why 2026 and 2027 are not interchangeable

The 2026 dates are mostly about transparency and marking: telling people when they are interacting with an AI system or looking at synthetic content, and giving synthetic media a machine-readable marker. Those duties attach to generative systems and to the deployers and providers that put them in front of the public.

The 2027 date is about an entirely different control regime — the full high-risk package of risk management, technical documentation, human oversight, logging and conformity assessment for stand-alone Annex III systems. A firm that deploys AI in recruitment, credit scoring, education or access to essential services is a high-risk deployer. A firm shipping a generative model with no such use case very often is not.

Nothing about the 2026 transparency duty discharges the 2027 high-risk obligations. Clearing the first does not buy time on the second, and preparing only for “the Act” without naming which regime applies to which system is the commonest error we see. The correct first move is a classification: place each of your systems on the Act’s risk tiers — prohibited, high-risk, limited, minimal — and read the timeline that attaches to that tier, not to your anxiety about the Act as a whole.

One consequence follows for Swiss firms in particular. A Swiss organisation whose AI output is used in the Union is a provider or deployer under the Act, exactly as an EU firm would be. “We are Swiss, so the Act does not apply” is the most expensive miscalculation in this market, and the 2026 transparency duties are the point at which it stops being theoretical.

The amending instrument

The dates above reflect the amending instrument, Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 — the AI Omnibus. It was agreed in political trilogue on 7 May 2026, approved by the European Parliament on 16 June 2026, given final Council approval on 29 June 2026, published in the Official Journal on 24 July 2026, and entered into force on 27 July 2026. It postpones the high-risk application dates and adds the new Article 5 prohibitions, while preserving the Act’s core risk-based structure. It does not extend the 2026 transparency duties for systems placed on the market on or after 2 August 2026.

What we watch, and what we do not claim

We track the Act against primary sources, and we say plainly where a date rests on a single source: we do not publish a row we cannot corroborate. Two items are deliberately omitted from the table above. The February 2027 “transparency code” watermark-detection date rests on a single source and is not verified. Swiss supervisory and reporting dates — the ISG and NCSC reporting regime, FINMA expectations — are obligations we name but do not date here, pending verification against the official Swiss texts.

If you want to know which of these rows actually binds your systems, that is a classification question, not a reading question. It is what our obligation diagnostic is for.

Last verified: 13 October 2026. Sources: European Commission AI Act service desk timeline; European Commission digital-strategy publications; European Parliament Legislative Train schedule.

Publication roadmap

What we publish, and how often

Cadence is itself a credibility signal: a predictable rhythm reads as an operating firm. What follows is the shape of each format and the themes we intend to publish on. Everything in this roadmap and in the themes that follow is planned rather than published — nothing here carries a date, and nothing is claimed to exist yet beyond the publication listed above.

Advisory note

One author, one thesis, short and decision-oriented. The workhorse: a fortnightly note.

Briefing

Structured depth on a method or framework. The flagship tier: a monthly briefing.

Quarterly outlook

A forward-looking outlook with named developments to watch, one per primary line and a geopolitical and cyberwarfare outlook each half-year.

Three formats, on a steady rhythm rather than in bursts.

Themes

Themes we publish on

Ten planned pieces, weighted so the primary lines dominate and the analytical lines demonstrate depth. Titles are working titles; each will be cleared on publication.

AI Governance · core

AI Governance Is a Risk Discipline, Not a Compliance Checkbox

Frames AI governance as an extension of the risk function, not a paperwork exercise. Outlines the questions a board should be able to answer about its AI systems.

AI Governance · core

The EU AI Act: What a Swiss Risk Owner Actually Has to Decide

Cuts through the regulatory summary to the concrete decisions a Swiss or EU-exposed firm must make, and in what order.

Cyber GRC · core

Cyber GRC in Practice: Turning Framework Overlap Into One Control Set

How to reconcile overlapping frameworks into a single, defensible control set — reducing audit fatigue without weakening assurance.

AI Governance · core

Third-Party AI: Governance Where You Have the Least Visibility

Third-party and vendor AI is where governance control is weakest and exposure highest. Suggests a proportionate due-diligence routine.

Cyber GRC · core

Board Reporting for Cyber GRC: Metrics That Survive Scrutiny

Argues for a small set of defensible metrics over a dashboard of noise, and shows how to report risk honestly to a non-specialist board.

Cyber GRC · core

Incident Governance: Who Decides When the Alarms Sound

Decision rights and escalation are the real cyber-governance failure point. Makes the case for rehearsed decision structures.

Geopolitical Risk · secondary

Reading the Board: Sanctions Exposure Before It Becomes a Finding

How to treat sanctions exposure as a forward risk to be mapped, not a screening result to be discovered late.

Geopolitical Risk · secondary

Base Case, Adverse Case: Why Single-Scenario Planning Fails

Explains the two-track scenario method and why naming trigger events matters more than predicting the outcome.

Cyberwarfare · secondary

When Attribution Is Uncertain: How to Read State-Linked Cyber Reporting

A guide to reading public threat reporting with appropriate confidence, and why assessed language is the professional standard.

Cross-cutting

Resilience Is an Operating Property: Where Continuity Sits Under Governance

Ties the legacy continuity line to the new core — continuity as the operational expression of governance.

We publish in English. Publications appear here, each with an author byline and a one-line note on the decision it helps you make. This roadmap describes intent, not commitments: no publication is claimed to exist until it is listed above with a date.

Exchange programme

Practitioners in related fields

This section carries the content of our previous Membership page.

Through regular exchanges with professionals in related fields, we continuously enrich our expertise.

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